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Con£: June 8, 1973 
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No. 72-1322 
, 
BRADLEY, ET AL. 
v . 
SCHOOL BD. OF 




Cert to CA 4, en bane 
(Haynsworth, CJ., Craven, 
Russell, Field; Winter 
dis sen ting) 
Fed/Procedure 
Timely 
Petrs were the successful plaintiffs in Bradley v. School Board of 
Jj 
Richmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965), and associated cases. At the close of 
Controlling Case: Thorpe v. Housing Authority of I)urham, 393 U.S . 268, 
281-182 (1969). 
Jj 





the long litigation, the USbC (E. D. Va.) (Merhige) awarded petrs $43,355 
of attorneys' fees, plus costs. CA 4, ~ bane (Haynsworth, C. J., Craven, 
Russell, Field, with Winter dissenting) reversed as to the award of 
attorneys' fees. Petrs contend: (1) that CA 4 erred as a matter of federal 
law in reversing the award, and (2) that § 718 of the new "Emergency School 
Aid Act" (86 Stat. 235, 1972), authorizing federal courts to award attorneys ' 
fees to successful plaintiffs in school de segregation cases, should have been 
applied in this case. 
2. Facts: 
(a) § 718 of the "Emergency School Aid Act" (86 Stat. 235), 
effective July 1, 1972, read in relevant part: 
]_/ 
Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the 
United State s against a local educational agency, a 
State (or any agency thereof) or the United States (or 
any agency thereof), for failure to comply with any 
provision of this title or for discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, or national origin in violation of title 
VI of the Civil Rights A ct of 1964, or the fourteenth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States as 
they pertain to elementary and secondary education, 
the court, in its discretion, upon a finding that the 
proceedings were n e cessary to bring about compliance, 
may allow the prev ailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 
See Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 345 F. 2d 310 (CA 4, 
1965), and Bradley v. School Boa rd of Richmond, 325 F. Supp. 328 (E. D. 
Va., 1971). This petition only deals with litigation concerning the schools 
within the city of Richmond. The subsequent orders of USDC (E. D. Va.) 
regarding Henrico and Chesterfield Counties, leading to the "Richmond 
School Case" (No. 72-549 and No. 72-550) recently aff ' d by an equally 





Petrs commenced this case in 1961 to desegregate the public 
schools of Richmond. In March, 1964, after extended litigation, the 
USDC (E. D. Va.) approved a "freedom of choice" plan proposed by resp 
school board. Petrs appealed to CA 4 which affirmed the lower court's 
finding that freedom of choice satisfied the school board's constitutional 
obligations. Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, Virginia, 345 F. 2d 310 
(1965 ). Petrs then petitioned this Court to consider the freedom of choice 
plan. On Nov. 15, 1965, this Court declined to review the CA 4 decision, 
but did grant petrs certain additional relief regarding discrimination in 
the assignment of teaching personnel. 382 U.S. 103. 
On March 30, 1966 the USDC (E. D. Va.) approved a freedom 
of choice plan submitted by the parties. The plan expressly stated that 
freedom of choice would have to be modified if it did not produce significant 
results. On May 27, 1968, this Court ruled that freedom of choice plans 
were not constitutionally permissible unless they actually brought about a 
unitary non-racial school system. Green v. County School Board of 
Kent County, 391 U.S. 430. On March 10, 1970 petrs moved in USDC (E. D. 
Va.) for additional relief under Green. Resp board conceded that the 
freedom of choice plan under which it had been operating was unconstitutional 
After considering a series of alternative and interim plans, the USDC 
approved a plan for the integration of the Richmond schools involving pupil 
reasignments and transportation only within the city of Richmond. 32 5 F . 





On Aug. 17, 1970, the USDC (E. D. Va.} directed the parties 
to attempt to reach agreeme nt on the matter of attorneys' fees . When the 
parties were unable to reach agreement, memoranda were submitted to the 
court. On May 26, 1971, the USDC (E. D. Va.} (Merhige} awarded petrs 
attorneys' fees of $43,355 as well as costs and expenses of $13,064.65 . 
The USDC based its decision on two grounds: (1) that the actions 
taken and defenses entered by the defendant School Board during such 
period represented "unreasonable" and "obdurate" refusal to implement 
"clear constitutional standards"; and (2) apart from any consideration of 
obduracy on the part of the defendant School Board since 1970, it is appro-
priate in school desegregation cases, for policy reasons, to allow counsel 
for the private parties attorneys' fees as an item of costs. The USDC also 
held that: 
"exercise of equity power requires the Court to allow 
counsels 1 fees and expenses, in a field in which Congress 
has authorized broad equitable re me dies I unless special 
circwnstances would render such an award unjust. '" 
3. Reasoning of court to be reviewed: CA 4 en bane (Haynsworth, 
C. J., Craven, Russell, Field, with Winter dissenting} reversed as to the 
allowance of attorneys 1 fees. First, while noting that whether 11the 
conduct of the School Board constitutes 'obdurate obstinacy' in a particular 
case is ordinarily committed to the discretion of the District Judge, to be 
disturbed only 1in the face of compelling circumstances,' 11 the C A 4 
, majority determined the USDC finding of obduracy in this case to be plain 





The record, as we .read it ... does not indicate that 
the Board was always halting, certainly not obstructive, 
in its efforts to discharge its legal duty to desegregate; 
nor does it seem that the District Court itself had always 
so construed the action of the Board . • • . All parties 
were awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court in Swann 
[402 U.S. 1 (1971(]. Before Swann was decided, however, 
the parties were engaged in an attempt to develop a novel 
method of desegregating the Richmond school system for 
which there was not at the time legal precedent. Nor can 
it be said that there was not some remaining confusion, at 
least at the District level, about the scope of Swann itself. 
The frustrations of the District Court in its commendable 
attempt to arrive at a school plan that would protect the 
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and others in their 
class, are understandable, but, to some extent, the School 
Board itself was also frustrated. It seems to be unfair to 
find under these circumstances that it was unreasonably 
obdurate. 
CA 4' s majority also rejected the USDC' s alternative ground of 
· "sound public policy. " The CA 4 noted: 
We find ourselves in agreement with the conclusion that 
if such awards are to be made to promote the public policy 
expressed in legislative action, they should be authorized 
by Congress and not by the courts. This is especially true 
in school cases, where the guidelines are murky and where 
harried, normally uncompensated School Boards must tread 
warily their way through largely uncharted and shadowy legal 
forests in their search for an acceptable plan providing what 
the courts will hopefully decide is a unitary school system. 
Finally, CA 4 held that§ 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act 
(86 Stat. 235) (effective July 1, 1972); which specifically authorizes federal 
courts to award attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs in school desegrega-
tion suits against local education authorities, did not apply to this case, but 
only to successful suits after July 1, 1972. Petr's successes were all 





Judge Winter filed a forceful opinion, dissenting on all grounds. 
Judge Winter emphasized that "As I read the record, I can only conclude 
that for the period for which an allowance of fees was made, the Richmond 
School Board was obdurately obstinate." More importantly, Judge Winter 
would hold that§ 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act specifically provides 
for awards of attorneys' fees in such cases as this one. Judge Winter 
observes: 
[T]he issue of the allowance of counsel fees has been 
an issue throughout every stage of the proceedings; 
and the proceedings were not terminated when§ 718 
became effective on July 1, 1972, because this appeal 
was pending before us. This is not a case where a 
subsequent statute is sought to be applied to events long 
past and to issues long finally decided. Rather, it is a case 
which presents the concurrent application of a statute to 
an issue still in the process of litigation at the time of its 
enactment. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch 
103 (1801), and Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 
U.S. 268 (1969), are the significant controlling authorities. 
. . . 
I would therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case 
for a redetermination of the amount of the allowance - - in 
short, I would require that counsel be compensated for their 
services to and including April 5, 1971 and also their ser-
vices on appeal in this case. 
4. Contentions of the parties: 
(a) ( 1) Petr s adopt t1:e reasoning of Judge Winters as to the 
correctness of the USDC finding· of "obstinate obduracy" and the proper 
applicability of § 718, Emergency School Aid Act, to this case. Failing to 
apply new legislation to pending controversies violates the plain words of 
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), that "an 
appellate court must apply the law in effect "at the time it renders its 






decision requires the appellate court to apply the changed law' .•• " 
393 U.S. 268, 281-182 (1969). 
(2) Petrs argue that the decision below conflicts with 
decisions by this Court and other CAs sanctioning awards of attorneys' 
fees to a plaintiff who has successfully maintained an action that benefits, 
even in a non-pecuniary way, a large group of other people. Petrs 
particularly point out Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-
393 (1970), and Yablonski v. UMW, 466 F. 2d 424, 431 n. 10 (CA DC 1972). 
(3) Petrs further argue that the decision below is incon-
sistent with decisions of this Court and at least five other CA s regarding 
the responsibility of state officials to dismantle dual school systems. 
Petrs emphasize that: 
This Court has long recognized that in equitable 
actions such as this the courts have the authority and 
responsibility to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing 
plaintiff where such an award is consistent with "fair 
justice." Sprague v. Ti conic National Bank, 307 U.S. 
164, 164-65 (1939). Pursuant to this rule, at least five 
circuits have held that legal fees must be paid in school 
civil rights cases to plaintiffs who should not have been 
compelled to resort to litigation to vindicate their clear 
rights. McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F. 2d 1109 (1st 
Cir. 1971); Horton v. Lawrence County Board of 
Education, 449 F. 2d 393 (5th Cir. 1971); Monroe v. 
Board of Commissioners of City of Jackson, 453 F. 2d 
259 (6th Cir.) cert. denied406 U.S. 945 (1972); Clark 
v. Board of Education of Little Rock School Dist., 449 
F. 2d 393 (8th Cir. 1971); cert. denied 405 U.S. 936 
(1972); 369 F. 2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966); Kelly v. Guinn, 
456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972). 
Petrs stress that the Richmond School Board resisted the clear mes sage of 
,this Court's decision in Green v. County School Board of New Kent, 391 U.S. 





"That responsibility shoul:d be enforced by requiring that parents and 
students who are still compelled at this late date to resort to litigation 
to obtain their well established rights be paid costs and attorneys' fees 
by the recalcitrant school board. 11 
(4) Finally, petrs argue that the result below conflicts 
with Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); 
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F. 2d 143 ( CA 5 1971), and 
Knight v. Amciello, 453 F. 2d 852, 853 (CA 1 1972). These cases held, 
according to petrs, that attorneys' fees are part of "full and appropriate 
relief" in school desegregation cases. The decision below erroneously 
restricts the broad equitable power of the USDC under 42 U.S. C. § l 983~ 
~ CAV\vl l.S 11 clearly 
at odds with this Court's recent holding that the mere absence of a provi s i on 
\\ 
for attorneys' fees does not evince "a purpose to circumscribe the c ourts ' 
power to grant appropriate remedies. 11 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. , 
396 u. s. 375, 391 (1970). 
(b) The short response essentially adopts the reasoning of 
CA 4' s majority, laid out above. Resps argue that the "obdurate 
obstinacy" test, applied by CA 4 below, has been uniformly followed b y 
all CAs who have considered attorneys' fees in school desegregation 
cases. 
1
'1he District Court applied this traditional standard, but the Cour t 
(ieco.,uH? 
of Appeals reversed the holding simply ) the record failed to suppor t the 
"' 
lower Court's findings that the School Board had exhibited that pattern of 





Resps also argue that the enactment of § 718 of Emergency School 
Aid Act, while inapplicable retroactively to this case, eliminates any 
need for this Court to establish additional federal standards to govern 
awards of attorneys' fees in school desegregation cases. Resps note: 
The very congressional authorization it [CA 4] found 
as lacking vis-~-vis the period of time involved in this 
case became a reality with the passage of Section 718 
of the Education Amendments A ct of 1972. This explicit 
statutory allow ance for awards of attorneys' fees to 
prevailing parties in school desegregation cases is, 
under the unanimous view of the Appeals Court, now 
fully applicable to any such cases pending before it. 
Finally, resps contend there is no conflict with Thorpe v. Housing 
Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). 
The gist of Petitioners I contentions is that Thorpe 
required the Court of Appeals to apply Section 718 
regardless of whether or not this case came within 
the specific terms of the statute itself (the Court found 
it did not -- 472 F. 2d 331-31; A. 61-62) and regard-
less of whether or not Congress clearly intended it to be 
applied retroactiv ely (the Court found no such intention --
472 F. 2d 178; A. 79-80). 
5. Discussion: The substantive issues raised by this case either: 
( 1 ) hinge on the factual finding by the majority of CA 4, ~ bane, that there 
was no "obdurate obstinacy" by the resp School Board, or (2) have been 
resolved for all future cases by the new § 718 of the Emergency School Aid 
Act, 86 Stat. 236, laid out supra. There are no conflicts between CAs as to 
'!:_/ 
the "obdurate obstinacy" standard its elf. 
'!:_/ 
See the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit school 






Failure to apply the new § 718 to this case, however, does appear 
to conflict with the language of this Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of 
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281-282 (1969)-. 
It 
[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before the decision 
of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively 
changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, 
or its obligation denied. . • • This same reasoning 
has been applied where the change was constitutional, 
statutory, or judicial." 393 U.S. 268, 281-282 (1969). 
Judge Winter argues that the pendency of this case in the CA 4 at the time 
§ 718 became law should require an application of the Thorpe doctrine, 
particularly because the pending case raised the very issue resolved by 
the new legislation. This argument makes some common sense. If Judge 
Winter's dissent persuades, this case would be certworthy on the Thorpe 
is sue. 
There is a response. 
5/29/73 
DK 
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